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Abstract 
The wide discretionary powers that are bestowed on the police necessitate the need for some 
mechanisms to curb abuse of these powers. The court, as an accountability institution, plays an 
important role in curtailing police abuse of power. This study explored the role of the court in police 
oversight in Zimbabwe, as well as examining the effectiveness of this important oversight institution in 
Zimbabwe. A total of 126 respondents drawn from institutions of accountability, were invited to 
participate through questionnaires and in-depth interviews. The study revealed that the court is an 
effective institution of police accountability, whose police oversight role is performed through: 
deciding on the propriety of police actions; presiding over criminal cases in which police officers are 
implicated; and presiding over civil suits against the police. However, despite the court’s effectiveness, 
the limited number of judicial officers and absence of a mechanism to implement court judgements 
against the police seem to militate against the court’s effectiveness. The constitution was widely viewed 
to be an effective legal document for enhancing police accountability, though its effectiveness largely 
depends on willingness of state institutions to adhere to constitutional provisions. Despite some 
obstacles, the court and the constitution are key independent mechanisms for curbing police abuse of 
power in the Republic of Zimbabwe. 
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1. Introduction 
Much of the parameters of what should be done and not done by the police are determined by the law 
(Harris, 2013, p. 37) and this makes legal control a key mechanism for police accountability. The court, 
as an institution for legal control, constitutes one of the most important external mechanisms of 
ensuring police accountability (Biswas, 2012, p. 2). Citizens can directly sue police officers for harms 
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caused to them by police officers (Haberfield & Cerrah, 2008; Shinar, 2009; Feltoe, 2012), resulting in 
monetary damages and injunctive relief (Bobb, 2010). In the English-Speaking democracies, legal 
control through statutory regulation of police powers, as well as case law pertaining to civil litigation 
against police abuse, has taken centre stage (Jones, 2008). While the main purpose of civil litigation is 
to enable individuals to seek redress for wrongs committed against them, trends in the numbers and 
types of cases being brought can indicate organisational failures in procedures, training, and 
supervision, and also provide a way for individuals to seek accountability for police misconduct 
(Ransley, Anderson, & Prenzler, 2007). Criminal law, civil and administrative laws are important tools 
in the control of police (Roberg et al., 2009) and it is the duty of the courts to interpret these laws. 
At the heart of legal accountability stands the principle that the police are subordinate to the law, just as 
other citizens are subordinate to the law (Harris, 2013). It is thus important to highlight that where a 
police officer commits misconduct which amounts to a criminal offence, the Judge or Magistrate will 
still have to adjudicate over the matter. Biswas (2012) highlights that any aggrieved person can file a 
criminal case at a police station or to a judicial magistrate against a police officer accused of any 
offence, such as: brutality, harassment, and any abuse of power. It is also important to highlight the 
constitution as a key legal control instrument. The bill of rights is one of the major features of the 
constitution and any citizen whose constitutional rights have been violated by the police can approach 
the courts for recourse (Feltoe, 2012). 
Courts have long been known to give judgements which have a direct bearing on police accountability. 
Judges and magistrates can also refuse to convict persons if the evidence is obtained illegally (Shinar, 
2009) and this also acts as a control measure. In the case of Mapp v Ohio (1961) 367 U.S 643, the court 
banned the use of illegally seized evidence in criminal cases and such an important decision was even 
co-opted into the Zimbabwean Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 11:09]. In another 
leading case of Miranda V Arizona (1966) 384 U.S 436, the court ruled that before questioning suspects, 
police officers should inform the suspects of their constitutional right to remain silent and their right to 
have an attorney. Courts can also oversee police accountability through judicial review of police 
disciplinary processes (Bronitt & Stenning, 2011). While judicial review has the potential to render 
police decision-making transparent and accountable, it is important to recognise its limitations. Bronitt 
and Stenning (2011, p. 329) argue that courts exercising judicial review are remote from the action in 
the streets, with many judges understandably reluctant to exercise close supervision over police 
decisions of operational nature. 
There are however potential problems with legal control. Though criminal prosecutions send powerful 
messages about police misconduct, they are relatively rare (Ransley, Anderson, & Prenzler, 2007). 
Reasons for this include: difficulties in collecting evidence, the criminal standard of proof necessary for 
conviction, and the reluctance by other police and prosecutors to take action (Ransley, Anderson, & 
Prenzler, 2007, p. 144). Consequently, Smith, in Ransley, Anderson and Prenzler (2007) suggests that 
police unlawfulness is much more widespread than the criminal statistics suggest and that a person 
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suffering from police misconduct has a far greater chance of achieving a remedy in the courts than 
through criminal prosecution or by using the complaints process. 
In light of the above background, this study sought to explore the effectiveness of the court as an 
institution for police accountability. Amongst others, the study sought to address the following 
objectives: to explore the role of the court in police accountability; to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
court as an institution for police accountability; and to identify the obstacles to the court’s police 
oversight role. The paper also explores some decided court cases that have implications on police 
accountability. 
1.1 The Zimbabwe Republic Police 
The Z.R.P, which is headquartered in the capital Harare, is a centrally controlled police organisation 
and is headed by a Commissioner General of Police. The organisation was formed at independence in 
1980 after the amalgamation of the colonial British South African Police (B.S.A.P) and two liberation 
movements namely; The Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe 
People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). At its inception, the organisation was created in terms of 
section 93 (1) of the then Lancaster House Constitution of 1980, which provided that: “There shall be a 
police force which, together with such other bodies as may be established by law for the purpose, shall 
have the function of preserving the internal security of and maintaining law and order in Zimbabwe”. 
The current Constitution of Zimbabwe, which was promulgated in 2013 provides for the creation of a 
police service on Section 219. Section 219 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe provides that; 
“There is a Police Service which is responsible for: Detecting, investigating and preventing crime; 
preserving the internal security of Zimbabwe; protecting and securing the lives and property of the 
people; maintaining law and order; and upholding the constitution and enforcing the law without fear 
or favour”. 
1.2 The Court System in Zimbabwe 
The law courts in Zimbabwe fall under the Judicial Service Commission, which is created in terms of 
section 189 of the Constitution. The courts, from the lowest to the highest include; the Magistrate Court, 
the High Court, The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. Civil cases are however filed with 
the High Court, whilst the Supreme Court acts as an appellate Court. The Constitutional Court handles 
any matters pertaining to violation of the Constitution. In relation to policing, the Constitutional Court 
mainly handles issues to do with the violation of the declaration of human rights. However, the 
researchers were only permitted to gather data from the Magistrate Courts. 
 
2. Methodology 
A total of 126 respondents were invited to participate in this study. The respondents, who were selected 
using stratified random and purposive sampling, were drawn from five institutions of police 
accountability namely: The Courts; the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission; The Parliament; The 
media and human rights based NGOs. The study was mainly confined to Harare Metropolitan area, 
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where majority of these institutions operate. The study adopted an explanatory sequential mixed 
methods design, wherein quantitative data was obtained before qualitative data. To this end, 
quantitative data analysis informed the nature of questions that were asked during in-depth interviews. 
The questionnaire and in-depth interviews were thus the major methods of gathering data. Quantitative 
data was analysed using the Software Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), while qualitative data was 
analysed using summative content analysis and was used to support quantitative data. In addition, a 
documentary survey was conducted on case law relating to police accountability, regardless of the 
place where the case was heard. 
 
3. Results and Findings 
3.1 The Court’s Police Oversight Roles 
Since much of the parameters of what should be done and not done by the police are determined by the 
law (Harris, 2013), the court plays an important role in dealing with issues of police accountablity. As 
regards police accountability, the role of the courts will thus be to interprete the legal provisions where 
the police act contrary to legal parameters. First, it is important to emphasise that, just as the court 
presides over all criminal matters wherein citizens are implicated, the court also presides over criminal 
law violations by police officers. To this end, the court passes the appropriate punishment on all cases 
where police officers are convicted of various criminal offences. In Zimbabwe, the courts fall under the 
Judicial Service Commission, from where authority was sought to gather data. Whilst there are seven 
courts in Zimbabwe, only four of these courts have a role in enhancing police accountability. These are; 
the Magistrate Court, the High Court, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. 
The role of the court in police accountability is multi-pronged, according to the judicial officers who 
were interviewed. One of the major roles is to adjudicate over civil suits against the police and to pass 
appropriate judgement. This role is mainly played by the High Court, which is empowered by section 
13 of the High Court Act [Chapter 7:06] to have full original civil jurisdiction over all persons and over 
all matters within Zimbabwe. Similarly, the Constitutional Court hears all cases involving infringement 
of fundamental human rights. Consequently, all cases involving human rights violation by police 
officers will be referred to the Constitutional Court. Moreover, if an issue about violation of human 
rights by police officers is raised during trial, the trial process will be stopped pending determination by 
the Constitutional Court. 
Judicial officers who were interviewed highlighted the tendency of suspects to complain about police 
brutality during their initial attendance at court. This could possibly point to the fact that suspects are 
comfortable with complaining to judicial officers than police officers. Ironic though, the judicial officer 
will have to refer the case back to the police to investigate the alleged incidents of police brutality. One 
judicial officer remarked, “the irony of it is that the judicial officer will have to refer the matter back to 
the alleged abusers...I know it sounds awkward but that’s how the system operates”. This then boils 
down to the same question, “will the police objectively investigate their own”, especially if they are 
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acting on allegations from the suspects. 
Interview respondents also had different opinion when they were asked about the role of the Courts in 
enhancing police accountability. The following were some of the responses. 
“The court is a key player in the justice delivery system. In addition to passing appropriate sentences 
for criminals, the court also considers the appropriateness of police action during the whole criminal 
justice process. When the police act outside the confines of their powers, it is the role of the courts to 
take a correct position…” (R4). 
“The role of the court is simple- to interpret laws. Whereas the police are there to enforce laws, the 
courts also consider the appropriateness of police behaviour during law enforcement. We often have 
situations in which police officers are accused of using inappropriate methods of gathering evidence, 
and the court has to take that into account during the trial proceedings” (R6). 
“The court ensures that the police are not a law onto themselves” (R7). 
“The court, specifically the High Court, presides over all the civil suits against the police especially on 
cases of police abuse of power. The court has been known to award necessary damages to victims of 
police abuse of power” (R12). 
“Just as they preside over cases committed by criminals, they also preside over offences committed by 
police officers” (R13). 
The above findings clearly show the importance of the court as a key institution for police 
accountability. The court is thus an important oversight arm of the government, amongst other arms 
such as the Executive and Legislature. As some of the respondents correctly pointed out, the role of the 
Court is to interpret laws. Similarly, the police, as an important arm of the Executive, have a major role 
of enforcing laws. Consequently, in the process of interpretation, the courts also judge the 
appropriateness of police behaviour. This way, the court acts as an accountability institution for the 
police. The position of the court as a key police accountability institution has been reiterated in several 
studies (Harris, 2013; Biswas, 2012; Bronnit & Stenning, n.d.). The findings also resonate with 
Swanson’s (2008) argument that courts have long been known to give judgements which have a direct 
bearing on police accountability. 
The opinion by Respondent 6 above supports findings by Shinah (2009) that judges and magistrates 
can also refuse to convict persons if the evidence is obtained illegally. To this end, any improper 
conduct by the police during the enforcement of the law will be reviewed by the courts during criminal 
proceedings. Also, some important court decisions have been widely accepted as standard operating 
procedure by police establishments across the globe. In the leading case of Miranda V Arizona (1966) 
384 U.S. 436, the court ruled that before questioning suspects, police officers should inform the 
suspects of their constitutional rights to remain silent and their right to have an attorney. The court’s 
decision, which is now widely known as the Miranda warning, has also been adopted as a standard 
operating procedure by the ZRP. 
Respondent 13 also raised a salient point in highlighting that judicial officers preside over criminal 
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cases that are committed by police officers. This resonates with Harris’s (2013) observation that at the 
heart of legal accountability stands the principle that the police are subordinate to the law, just as other 
citizens are subordinate to the law. However, the question of who should investigate the police will 
remain unanswered. Another important observation on criminal prosecution is highlighted by Ransley 
et al. (2007) when they remark, “though criminal prosecutions send powerful messages about police 
misconduct, they are relatively rare”. 
Another respondent (R14) brought in an important dimension of the court’s police oversight role when 
he opined that, “the court also has the power to review all the police internal disciplinary processes”. 
This important role is also noted by Bronitt and Stenning (2011) who assert that courts can also oversee 
police accountability through judicial review of police disciplinary processes. Though this system is 
important, it only works to the extent that parties to the police disciplinary trial challenge the police 
board’s decision. 
3.2 Effectiveness of the Courts 
An overwhelming majority trust the Court as a police accountability institution. As depicted on Figure 
1, three quarters of the respondents from external accountability institutions considered the courts to be 
either effective (48.4%) or very effective (27.0%). Whist 16.7% of the respondents considered the 
courts to be somewhat effective, only 6.3% and 1.6% considered the courts to be less effective and not 
effective respectively. 
 
           N=126 
 
Figure 1. Respondents’ Opinion on the Effectiveness of the Courts in Holding the Police to 
Account 
 
A further analysis of the statistics on Table 1 reveals a mean statistic of 3.9286, a Standard Deviation of 
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0.91371, a variance of 0.835 and a -0.880 level of skewness. The statistics clearly reveal gravitation 
towards effectiveness of the courts. 
 
Table 1. Statistics on the Effectiveness of the Courts 
1 2 3 4 5 Mean SD Variance Sp 
1.6% 6.3% 16.7% 48.4% 27.0% 3.9286 0.91371 0.835 -0.880 
Note. 1-not effective; 2-less effective; 3-somewhat effective; 4-effective; 5-very effective; SD-standard 
deviation; Sp-Skewness. 
 
Majority of the interviewees also indicated that currently, the court is the most effective police 
accountability institution. Interview respondents were asked to comment on the effectiveness of the 
courts in enhancing police accountability and the following were some of the views. 
“In the absence of an effective independent body to deal with cases of police abuse of power, we have 
to put our trust in the courts” (R2). 
“I tell you, among all the accountability institutions that you can think of- the court is the most effective. 
They understand the law, which puts them in a better position to judge the appropriateness of some of 
police actions” (R6). 
“There has been a great improvement in the manner in which the courts handle cases in which the 
police are implicated. Previously the courts were known to show bias in favour of the police, especially 
on public gatherings. We were finding it difficult to hold rallies and the police would just deny us our 
constitutional right. But I tell you, it’s now a different ball game. Even if the police deny us our 
freedom of assembly and gathering, the courts, in the interest of justice are always on our side” (R4). 
Most of the interviewees commented the professionalism and impartiality that is currently being 
exhibited by the courts. This is in sharp contrast with the situation that obtained some years back when 
the courts were being accused of passing judgements which were politically biased. Other respondents 
cited several judgements by the High Court in 2016 in which political parties approached the courts 
after the police had denied them authority to conduct their rallies. The police cited lack of manpower as 
the reason for denying the political parties their constitutional rights. All the judgements were passed in 
favour of political parties. If the police were left to decide on who should be allowed to conduct rallies, 
then citizens’ constitutional freedom of assembly would be arbitrarily violated by the police. To this 
end, the court also has an enforcement mechanism to prevent the police from violating citizens’ rights. 
However, the respondents had mixed reactions on the capacity of the courts to handle cases of police 
abuse. Despite the majority’s opinion on the effectiveness of the courts, 53.1% were inclined to agree 
with the fact that courts have the capacity and are independent enough to deal with incidents of police 
abuse of power (Table 2). Those who were inclined to disagree constituted 30.2% whilst 16.7% were 
neutral. 
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Table 2. Response on Whether the Courts Have Capacity and are Independent Enough with 
Incidents of Police Abuse of Power 
Response Frequency Percent 
Strongly disagree 15 11.9 
Disagree 23 18.3 
Neutral 21 16.7 
Agree 43 34.1 
Strongly agree 24 19.0 
Total 126 100.0 
 
As a follow up, interview respondents were also asked to comment on the capacity and independence 
of the court to handle incidents of police abuse of power. Majority of the interviewees highlighted the 
need to differentiate the two terms, capacity and independence. Below are some of the responses that 
were given; 
“The answer is no and yes. As regards the capacity, I don’t think they have the capacity, considering 
the backlog that characterises court cases. But for independence, they have that independence. The 
court is one institution in which politicians have found it difficult to interfere with” (R6). 
“Whilst the issue of capacity is subject to debate, I think the independence of the court is not 
questionable. In fact, independence is the hallmark of any effective judiciary. The court has on several 
occasions passed judgements against government policy and that on its own shows the independence of 
the judiciary” (R8). 
“I don’t believe they have the capacity, considering the limited number of courts and trial officers. 
However for independence, I think the court is the most independent institution amongst all institutions 
of accountability” (R9). 
Whilst the Court, as a police accountability institution is credited for its independence, the issue of 
limited capacity seems to militate against the court’s effectiveness. Currently the High Court is located 
in Harare and Bulawayo and this creates a depressed capacity for the courts to effectively deal with 
cases throughout the whole country. However, despite the opening of the High Courts in two cities 
Masvingo and Mutare, the two courts were not yet operational at the time of writing this article. A 
different scenario exists in the neighbouring Republic of South Africa, where there are High Courts in 
all the country’s provinces. The fact that the courts do not have the capacity to speedily deal with 
criminal cases also implies that the court’s role of monitoring police behaviour will also be delayed. 
3.3 Civil Suits and the Courts 
Feltoe (2012, p. 127), commenting on the State Liabilities Act [Chapter 8:14] says, “...the state can be 
sued vicariously for delictual and contractual wrongs committed by State employees in the course of 
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their employment”. This therefore implies that the state will bear the burden for civil wrongs done by 
individual police officers. To this end, citizens can directly sue police officers for harm caused to them 
by police officers (Haberfield & Cerrah, 2008; Shinar, 2009; Feltoe, 2012). This way, the courts also 
enhance police accountability. Judgements that have been made against police officers are contained in 
various law reports and cyclostyled judgements, an indication that the courts are holding the police to 
account. 
Most civil suits are filed based on allegations of false arrests/imprisonment, excessive use of force, 
negligence, constitutional violations and unlawful invasion of privacy (Mugari, 2014). McCullock and 
Palmer, in Mugari (2014) also highlight the trend towards greater resort to civil litigation against the 
police, combined with a definite trend to substantially larger judgements in favour of plaintiffs. To this 
end, citizens no longer hesitate to sue the police due to the large sums of money involved. To highlight 
the importance of the Court as a police oversight institution, Table 3 shows selected judgements on 
civil suits against the police. 
 
Table 3. Selected Civil Suits against the Zimbabwe Republic Police 
Case Reason for civil suit Quantum of damages 
Botha V Zvada 1997 (1) 
ZLR 415 (S) 
Unlawful arrest and detention 
Facts: A 71 year old man was arrested on 
allegations of murder by the police though there 
was no strong evidence linking him to the crime. 
He was detained in custody for 6 days under 
squalid conditions. 
Z$20,000 
Karimazondo and 
Another V Minister of 
Home Affairs and Others 
2001 (2) ZLR 363 (H) 
Unlawful arrest, detention and torture 
Facts: The plaintiffs were both arrested on 
allegations of murder but the charges were 
subsequently dropped. The plaintiffs were 
subjected to torture whilst in custody and suffered 
long lasting physical and psychological effects. 
Z$1,500,000 
Mugwagwa V Minister 
of Home Affairs and 
Another HH-183-2004 
Assault by police officers 
Facts: The plaintiff who was a member of the 
opposition MDC was arrested on allegations of 
arson. He was assaulted on the way to the station 
and on arrival at the station. 
Z$300,000 
Chituku V Minister of 
Home Affairs and Others 
HH-6-2004 
Inhuman treatment by police whilst in police 
custody 
Facts: The plaintiff was arrested on a warrant of 
Z$100,000 
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arrest and was detained under inhuman conditions. 
The cell was overcrowded with a mal- functioning 
flushing system and he was denied supper. 
Mukumba V Minister of 
Home Affairs and 
Another HH-84-2009 
Assault by police 
Facts: The plaintiff was assaulted by members of 
the police riot squad during disturbances that had 
occurred in Harare’s Budiriro suburb. Police 
officers forced their entry into her house, threw 
tear smoke and assaulted everyone in the house. 
US$300 
Nyandoro V Minister of 
Home Affairs and 
Another HH-196-2010 
Assault by police officers 
Facts: The plaintiff had been arrested for taking 
part in a peaceful demonstration. The police broke 
up the demonstration, arresting the plaintiff in the 
process. He was assaulted by about 10 police 
officers on the way to the police station and on 
arrival at the station. 
US$5000 
Muskwe V Minister of 
Home Affairs and Others 
HH-83-2013 
Unlawful arrest and detention 
Facts: Plaintiff, a 65 year old was unlawfully 
arrested. He was taken to a police cell and 
handcuffed to a metal pipe, first by hanging from 
the pipe and then latter in a stooping position. 
US$1500 
Source: Selected cases from Zimbabwe Law Reports and Cyclostyled judgements. 
 
As depicted on Table 3, citizens have been able to successfully sue the police for incidence of police 
abuse of power. This stresses the court’s oversight role over the police. What is even more important is 
that most of these judgements are found online; hence citizens can refer to the cases for guidance 
whenever they intend to sue the police. Civil suits against the police also have a deterrent effect on 
police abuse of power, as the police will try by all means to avoid these costly civil suits through 
enlightening police officers. 
However, most of the respondents bemoaned the limited number of judicial officers to preside over 
civil suits against the police, especially given the fact that civil suits cannot be filed at the magistrates’ 
courts. With only the High Court as the court of first instance for civil suits against police and the 
Supreme Court as an appeal court, the courts may find it difficult to handle cases in time. Currently, the 
High Court is located in Harare and Bulawayo, whilst another High Court which was recently opened 
in Masvingo is yet to commence operations. To this end, majority of the respondents indicated that the 
court often takes long to pass judgements on civil suits against the police (Figure 2). 
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As depicted on Figure 2, slightly above half (52.4%) of the respondents were inclined to agree with the 
fact that courts often take long to pass judgements on civil suits against the police. The 22.2% 
proportion of those who indicated neutral could have been by respondents who were not well 
conversant with the courts. Only a quarter of the respondents were inclined to disagree with the 
opinion. 
 
           N=126 
 
Figure 2. Response on Whether the Court Takes Long to Pass Judgements on Civil Suits against 
the Police 
 
One human rights lawyer who was interviewed noted three incidents in which he had represented 
victims of police abuse of power, whereby the cases had to be finalised after three years. The old adage 
which goes “justice delayed is justice denied” seems to be a true reflection of the current state of affairs. 
However most of the interview respondents noted that the delay was not only common with civil cases 
but criminal cases as well. 
Another barrier that was highlighted by five respondents (R2, R4, R7, R12 and R16) was lack of 
mechanisms to enforce the court’s decision when the court orders the police to pay damages. The 
respondents highlighted several cases in which the police were ordered to pay damages and they just 
chose not to comply with the court judgements. In one of the case cited (Muskwe V Minister of home 
Affairs and Others HH-83-2013), the Human Rights NGO Forum (2014), reports that the plaintiff died 
in 2014, a year after he had been awarded damages, but the damages had not yet been paid. 
The delay in the payment of damages can also be due to the loopholes in the statutes governing civil 
liability. Whilst the State Liabilities Act [Chapter 8:14] imposes liabilities upon the State in respect of 
its employees, section 5 of the Act outlaws attachment of State property. Consequently a plaintiff can 
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win the civil suit against the police, but can have a hard time to receive payment given the fact that the 
plaintiff is not permitted by law to attach police property. 
3.4 The Constitution-Effective or Mere Legal Document 
Whilst the court has been viewed as an effective police oversight institution, its effectiveness hinges on 
a supportive legal framework. This part therefore explores the effectiveness of the constitution, as a key 
legal document for police accountability. The constitution, as the supreme law of the land has 
important provisions for curtailing police abuse of power. To this end, respondents were asked to 
indicate the effectiveness of the current constitution in curbing police abuse of power and their 
responses are indicated on Table 4. 
A total of 54% of the respondents from external accountability institutions considered the constitution 
to be either effective (35.7%) or very effective (18.3%). Slightly above a quarter considered the 
constitution to be somewhat effective, whilst 19.9% considered it to be either less effective (18.3%) or 
not effective (1.6%). The mean statistic of 3.5079 shows gravitation towards effectiveness.  
 
Table 4. Statistics on the Effectiveness of the Constitution 
1 2 3 4 5 Mean SD Variance Sp 
1.6% 18.3% 26.2% 35.7% 18.30% 3.9286 1.04112 1.084 -0.238 
Note. 1-not effective; 2-less effective; 3-somewhat effective; 4-effective; 5-very effective; SD-standard 
deviation; Sp-skewness. 
 
The above statistics show that respondents had faith in the constitution as a key legal accountability 
measure. However, in comparison with the effectiveness of the courts, the statistics seem to suggest 
that the court is more effective as an institution of police accountability. It also has to be understood 
that the effectiveness of the constitution thrives on the effectiveness of the court. This was supported by 
one respondent who remarked that, “we can have an effective constitution but if we do not have an 
effective court system, the constitution will loose its effectiveness”. 
Interview respondents also reiterated the importance of the constitution, with some of them comparing 
the current constitution to the now defunct Lancaster House Constitution. The following were some of 
the responses on the question, how effective is the constitution in curbing police abuse of power? 
“If you are to compare our current constitution with the previous constitution, you will notice a great 
improvement, especially on the declaration of rights. The chapter on the declaration of human rights is 
well articulated to meet international standards” (R5). 
“...the provisions on the powers of arrest and detention are well articulated. For example, once the 
police arrest a suspect, they have to bring him before a trial officer within a time of not more than 
forty-hours, and if they fail to meet that time the constitution provides that the police have to 
unconditionally release the suspect. This section will go a long way in preventing unlawful arrest and 
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detention. Also, previously Sundays and public holidays were not considered as court days but with the 
current constitution, Sundays and public holidays are court days and are counted in the forty-eight 
hour detention time limit” (R8). 
“...other than just stating the Bill of Rights, the constitution provides a way of enforcing violation of 
human rights, for example, the provision that anyone can approach the High Court if they have 
reasonable grounds to believe that a suspect is being unlawfully detained by the police. Again there is 
a provision that any person who is unlawfully detained can claim compensation from the person who is 
responsible for the detention. Such provisions were conspicuously absent in the Lancaster House 
constitution” (R10). 
“As a document, I think it is good, but it’s not enough to have a good document. We need various 
institutions, including the police to make sure that the document is effective. We also need an effective 
judicial sector to make sure that the provisions of the constitution are adhered to... so it is only 
effective to the extent that institutions are willing to comply with it” (R11). 
Most of the views from the above respondents (R5; R8; R10) seem to point to the fact that the current 
constitution is effective, at least to the extent that it has important provisions to curb police abuse of 
power. A comparison of the current constitution to the Lancaster House constitution clearly shows an 
improvement, especially on the declaration of rights. Moreover, the current constitution also reiterates 
the need for the police service to uphold the constitution on Section 219 (1) (e). However, an 
interesting fact was highlighted by Respondent 11, when he asserted that the constitution is effective to 
the extent that the police uphold it. This leaves the court as an important institution which ensures 
compliance with constitutional provisions. 
To further gauge their views on the effectiveness of the constitution as a key legal instrument for 
enhancing police accountability, respondents were also asked to indicate their response on the 
adequacy of constitutional provisions which curtail police abuse of power. Their responses are 
presented on Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Response on Adequacy of Constitutional Provisions Which Curtail Police Abuse of 
Power 
Response Frequency Percent 
1. Not adequate 12 9.5 
2. Less than adequate 11 8.7 
3. Somewhat adequate 32 25.4 
4. Adequate 69 54.8 
5. More than adequate 2 1.6 
Total 126 100.0 
Note. Mean-3.3016; SD-0.99816; Variance-0.996; Sp-1.129. 
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Slightly above half (56.4%) of the respondents considered the constitutional provisions to be adequate. 
Approximately a quarter considered the provisions to be somewhat adequate, whilst only 18.2% 
considered the provisions to be either less than adequate (8.7%) or not adequate (9.5%). Further the 
mean statistic of 3.3016 point to the opinion that the constitutional provisions are somewhat adequate. 
Commenting on the adequacy of the constitutional provisions, one respondent (R5) noted that that the 
constitution alone should not be enough. He argued, 
“... remember, the constitution has to address all the issues of governance, not only issues to do with 
policing. We cannot expect the constitution to give every minute detail on how the police should 
operate. Therefore, the constitutional provisions are only adequate to the extent of laying the 
foundation for other relevant laws”. 
To this end, while the constitution lays the solid foundation for enhancing police accountability in 
Zimbabwe, we also have to rely on other pieces of legislation for detailed laws which curtail police 
abuse of power. The Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, as well as the Police Act, which have been 
already discussed, are other relevant statues which have to be read with the important constitutional 
provisions. Guided by the constitutional provisions, the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, as well 
as the Police Act, subsequently lay down the detailed procedure which should be followed by the 
police in exercising their powers. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The role of the Court is multi pronged; reviewing police actions during criminal trials, presiding over 
criminal cases in which police officers are accused of criminal offences and presiding over civil suits 
against the police. The findings have revealed that the Court is an effective institution for police 
accountability. Amongst other institutions of police accountability, the Court in Zimbabwe is viewed to 
be an independent institution, which oftentimes has issued critical judgements against police abuse of 
powers and functions. This is an important development, especially given the fact that the success of 
any legal accountability mechanisms rest on the will power of the court. The major obstacles to the 
effectiveness of the courts are; the limited number of judicial officers, and lack of mechanisms to 
enforce judgements against the police. Also, the Constitution is widely viewed to be an effective legal 
document for police accountability. However the effectiveness of the Constitution can only be realised 
if there is an effective and independent judiciary to enforce compliance with the constitutional 
provisions.  
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